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This is questionable in that the ordinance clearly provides for control
by a committee of not less than ten."6 It also defines the type of housing
to be controlled,47 establishes the basis for the maximum rent to be
charged, 48 defines the circumstances under which adjustments of maxi-
mum rents may be made by the city rent agency,49 and finally the provi-
sions state objective guidelines for the exercise of power by the city rent
agency.
In sum, while Fleetwood precludes the establishment of rent con-
trols by a municipality in the absence of enabling state legislation, it
has far broader implications. The judicial limitation on the home rule
powers of municipalities, imposed by the creation of a local-state function
test for allocating power, effectively places basic policy choices on the
judicial branch of the government. It is submitted that the courts are
neither the proper forum for such decisions to be made, nor are they
the best mechanism for determining the needs of the people at any
particular time.
RICHARD A. HERMAN
MERCHANT-BUYER'S GOOD FAITH DUTY TO INQUIRE
UNDER 9-307: A CONFUSION, OF CONCEPTS
The plaintiff, J. I. Case Company, sold a tractor to Florida Tractor
Mart, Inc., and took back a security agreement (a conditional sales
contract), and a financing statement which it recorded.' Florida Tractor
then delivered possession of the tractor to Gator Tractor Company
pursuant to an oral lease.2 Shortly thereafter Gator Tractor traded the
tractor to the defendant, Swift, in exchange for three other items of
equipment
46. Section 16.A.3.C. of Ordinance 1791, provides:
There shall be an advisory committee composed of not less than 10 members who
shall be appointed by the city council. The committee shall be provided by the ad-
ministrator with all data necessary for it to advise and consult with the Mayor and
City Council for all its actions. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice Ervin, in his dissent, points out that the city rent agency is a branch of the
Miami Beach government and as such is subject to the controls of, and accountable to
the Mayor and city council. 261 So.2d at 811.
47. See note 1 supra.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. See note 39 supra.
1. See FLA. STAT. § 679.302(1) (1971). Florida has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code in cbs. 671-79 FLA. STAT. (1971). The Code sections correspond to the last four
numbers of the statute section.
2. Once Case Company's security interest was perfected, it continued, despite the
leasing of the tractor by Florida Tractor to Gator Tractor. FLa. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1971).
3. The exchange of equipment between Swift and Gator Tractor constituted a "buying"
and therefore Swift became a "buyer" of the tractor. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(9) (1971).
CASES NOTED
Plaintiff's replevin complaint charged that its perfected security
interest in the controverted tractor was superior to any rights subse-
quently acquired by Swift Ford Tractor, Inc. The trial court entered
partial summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that it was entitled
to recover immediate possession of the tractor and damages for its
detention. Defendant took an interlocutory appeal. The District Court
of Appeal, First District, held, affirmed: A commercially prudent tractor
merchant may not purchase a tractor from another dealer and thereby
acquire title free of a prior recorded security interest without first mak-
ing a good-faith inquiry into the existence and terms of such previously
perfected security interest. Swift v. J. I. Case Company, 266 So.2d 379
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
The holding in Swift that a merchant has a duty to inquire into the
existence of previously perfected security interests was precipitated by
the court's misapplication of section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. This section states:
A buyer in ordinary course of business . . . [subsection (9) of
Section 1-201] other than a person buying farm products
from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a
security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its
existence.
4
The court stated the thrust of that section as follows: "In this state a
buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected
security interest.
' 5
The court failed to note the important qualification that the security
interest must be "created by his [the buyer's] seller." Thus section
9-307(1) would allow Swift to take free of a security interest created by
his seller, Gator Tractor, but not free of a security interest created by
one other than his seller, in this case, Florida Tractor." Therefore, Case
Company's perfected security interest was superior to the after-acquired
rights of Swift, although the court did not adopt this rationale.
The court, however, reached this same conclusion-that Case Com-
pany should prevail-by reasoning that Swift was not a "buyer in ordinary
4. FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
5. 266 So.2d at 381.
6. This issue has come to the attention of four courts. A recent decision by a California
appellate court illustrates the correct application of this aspect of section 9-307(1) in
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763 (2d Dist.
1972). Accord, National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967).
That it is easy to overlook this limitation "created by his seller" and misapply section
9-307(1) is illustrated by the dicta in the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Western Crane & Rigging Co., 184 Neb. 212, 166 N.W.2d 409
(1969). The Supreme Court of Iowa recognized this limitation but chose to disregard it
because of the compelling and unique facts giving rise to the case in General Motors Accep.
v. Keil, 176 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1970).
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course of business"7 and, therefore, was not entitled to take free of Case
Company's security interest under section 9-307(1). This inquiry into
whether Swift was a buyer in ordinary course was both necessary and
proper only assuming Case Company's security interest had been created
by Swift's seller, Gator Tractor, rather than by Florida Tractor. The
conclusion of the court, however, that Swift was not a buyer in ordinary
course because he failed to inquire into the existence of any prior secu-
rity interest appears to have been a misapplication of section 1-201(9)
as used in the context of section 9-307(1).
Section 1-201(9) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a buyer
in ordinary course of business as one who buys in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the security interest of
a third party.8 Section 9-307(1) of the Code provides that such a buyer
takes free of a security interest created by his own seller even though he
knows it exists.9 Reading these two provisions together,
the buyer takes free if he merely knows that there is a security
interest which covers the goods but takes subject [to the secu-
rity interest] if he knows, in addition, that the sale is in violation
of some term in the security agreement not waived by the words
or conduct of the secured party.1°
Thus the duty of inquiry imposed upon merchant buyers by the court in
Swift is meaningless unless the duty extends to inquiry into the terms
of the security agreement, for mere knowledge of the existence of the
security interest does not defeat the priority of the buyer.
But must a merchant buyer inquire into the terms of a prior, per-
fected security interest in order to qualify for the protection provided for
in section 9-307(1)? The answer to this question may be found in an
analysis of the good faith element in the definition of buyer in ordinary
course of business. The court in Swift reasoned that the requirements
for establishing one's self as a good faith buyer vary with the commercial
status of the buyer. Since Swift was a tractor dealer, the court looked to
section 2-103(1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code for the require-
ments of good faith: " 'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade."'" Thus, concluded the court, commercial
reasonableness demands that a merchant buyer make an inquiry, and
failure to do so constitutes bad faith.
7. "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
FLA. STAT. § 671.201(9) (1971) (emphasis added).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1971).
10. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-307, Comment 2 (1966) (Comments to the UCC are not
contained in Florida Statutes).
11. FLA. STAT. § 672.103(1)(b) (1971).
CASES NOTED
The section 2-103(1)(b) definition of good faith utilized by the
court to impose upon Swift the duty of inquiry as an observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards is not applicable to the section 1-201(9)
definition of buyer in ordinary course when used in the context of section
9-307(1). That this Article 2 definition of good faith is not applicable
to Article 9 is suggested by section 9-105(4), which states that Article 1
contains the general definitions applicable in Article 9.12 Article 1, section
1-201 (19) of the Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned, 18 and does not include the requirement of
commercial reasonableness. That the Article 2 definition of good faith,
including commercial standards, is inapplicable to Article 9 is further
suggested by the official commentary:
"Good faith," whenever it is used in the Code, means at least
what is here stated [honesty in fact]. In certain Articles, by
specific provision, additional requirements are made applicable.
See, e.g., Secs. 2-103(1) (b) . . . [observance of reasonable
commercial standards]. To illustrate, in the Article on Sales,
Section 2-103, good faith is expressly defined as including in
the case of a merchant observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade, so that throughout that
Article wherever a merchant appears in the case an inquiry into
his observation of such standards is necessary to determine his
good faith."4
The Supreme Court of Delaware recently passed on this precise
issue in Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp.5 Reversing both lower
courts, the court said:
The error we find here lies in the Trial Court's misapplication
of the Sales Article definition of "good faith," set forth in
§ 2-103(1)(b), instead of the Secured Transaction Article
definition of "good faith," set forth in § 1-201(19). In so doing,
the Trial Court found that, although the appellants were honest
in fact, they did not act "in a commercially reasonable manner."
The Trial Court reasoned that, in substance, this secured trans-
action revolved around a sale of the automobiles; that since
Article 2 of the Code deals with the sale of goods, the definition
of "good faith" in that Article must be applied; with the result
that a merchant-buyer's "good faith" is to be distinguished
from the "good faith" of a consumer-buyer under Article 9 of
the Code. In the view of the Trial Court, it was not reasonable
to conclude that the drafters of the Code intended to apply
more than one standard of "good faith" to the same individual
in related transactions and that, therefore, the definition in
12. FLA. STAT. § 679.105(4) (1971).
13. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1971).
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1-201, Comment 19 (1966) (emphasis added).
15. - Del. -, 290 A.2d 648 (1972).
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§ 2-103 (1) (b) must be applied to merchant-buyers throughout
the entire Code. See 269 A.2d 407. We are unable to approve
that rationale.
Article 2 of the Code concerns itself with the rights and
obligations of buyer and seller, one to the other. Here we are
concerned with the rights and obligations of buyer and secured
creditor, one to the other-a transaction expressly controlled
by Article 9.18
In this situation, 17 when a buyer meets the qualifications of section
9-307, he takes free of the security interest in the goods. Nevertheless,
the creditor's security interest still continues in the proceeds of the sale
in the hands of the debtor-seller." When a buyer is denied the protection
of section 9-307, the creditor's security interest continues in both the
proceeds and the collateral goods. 19 Thus to impose a duty of inquiry
to any extent, on any buyer, which will act to defeat his status as a
buyer in ordinary course of business, is in effect to require the buyer to
assume the economic risk that a debtor-seller will fail to apply the pro-
ceeds from an unauthorized sale toward the satisfaction of his debt.
When a buyer has actual knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the security interest of a third party and still elects to buy,
the buyer is in effect consciously assuming the risk that the debtor-seller
will satisfy his debt from the proceeds, and is thus denied the protection
of section 9-307. But where the buyer does not have actual knowledge,
why should he be burdened, under the guise of good faith, with an eco-
nomic risk that should rightfully fall on the creditor?"0
Thus, the court in Swift reached the correct result-that Case Com-
pany's prior perfected security interest should prevail over the rights of
Swift-by making two independent mistakes in its application of section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code to the facts. The second of
these mistakes cancelled the first. The protection to buyers provided in
section 9-307(1) was not available to Swift since the prior perfected
security interest in the tractor was not created by Swift's seller. There-
fore, it was unnecessary to deny Swift this protection by holding him
not to be a buyer in the ordinary course of business, which, in the
author's opinion, he was. The drafters of the Code achieved a delicate
16. Id. at 650.
17. It must be remembered that the scope of section 9-307 is limited primarily to
inventory situations in which the creditor-holder of the security interest-has forbidden
any sale by the debtor or has placed latent limitations upon the debtor's apparent authority
to sell. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-307, Comment 2 (1966).
18. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1971).
19. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1971).
20. It is interesting to note that in two New York decisions, the courts assumed with-
out analysis that the Article 2 definition of good faith applied to merchant-buyers in
Article 9, yet expressly held that failure to make an inquiry into the existence of prior
perfected security interests did not constitute bad faith. Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc.,
36 App. Div. 2d 6, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1971); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental
Sys., Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970).
CASES NOTED
balance between the rights of a secured party and a subsequent buyer
in sections 9-306 and 9-307, and to engraft into either section, by judicial
interpretation, requirements that are not there, upsets this balance. The
proper result in Swift should not be accepted blindly. An understanding
of the concepts underlying sections 9-306 and 9-307 is essential to their
proper application.
ADAM K. LLEWELLYN
THE RIGHT TO LIGHT: DUE PROCESS AND
PUBLIC UTILITY TERMINATION
Colorado gas and electric customers sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, as well as money damages, against a privately owned Colorado
public utility company. Their complaint in the federal district court
charged that the company had violated the customers' rights to proce-
dural due process by unlawfully terminating their gas and electric service
without a hearing or without providing for one. Plaintiffs contended that
the public utility's termination of service involved state action within the
purview of the Civil Rights Acts,1 and thus gave federal jurisdiction over
the basic dispute. The company maintained that its policy of terminating
service for failure to pay bills did not involve state action, and, therefore,
that the customers did not have a claim for the taking of property with-
out due process. The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, refusing to grant the motion to dismiss,' held: The actions of
a privately owned public utility operating under close supervision of the
state public utilities commission and supplying service under an exclusive
franchise from the state are "state action" under the purview of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970). Hattell v. Public Service Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo.
1972).
1. The Civil Rights Acts are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action in the event a state contravenes the Constitution.
The act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to redress deprivation
under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution. Section 1343(3) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States. . ..
2. The claim for money damages, however, was dismissed. It was asserted under state
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